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Abstract
Justifying judicial review as a democratic institution is a core concern of Cristina Lafont’s splendid
new book. Even though her interpretation is appealing, this also poses some problems. This is due
to the non-thematization of ideology that results from Lafont’s ideal-theoretical and argument-
privileging approach. I will first address this ideology-problem and then reflect on the implications
that this has for the question of what is considered legitimate political action.
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Justifying judicial review as a democratic institution is a core concern of Cristina
Lafont’s splendid new book. Even though her interpretation is appealing, I feel a certain
discomfort. This is mainly because the great trust in judicial review that this interpreta-
tion evokes may tempt one to dismiss certain forms of dominating power. This is due to
the non-thematization of ideology that results from Lafont’s ideal-theoretical and argu-
ment-privileging approach. I will first address this ideology-problem and then reflect on
the implications that this has for the question of what is considered legitimate political
action. As my title already indicates, I took some inspiration from Iris Young’s famous
essay Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy, in which she presents a staged
exchange between a deliberative democrat and a political activist, who raises four
challenges that he thinks the deliberativist cannot adequately address.
(I) Deliberative democracy in Lafont’s understanding is characterized by the ‘the
rule of considered public opinion’ (102). The underlying ideal of democratic
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Germany.
Email: paul.soerensen@phil.uni-augsburg.de
Philosophy and Social Criticism
2021, Vol. 47(1) 26–30





self-determination demands mutual justification among equal citizens and is incompa-
tible with any kind of blind deference. Lafont emphasizes that ‘such an approach
requires institutions to be in place such that citizens can contest any laws and policies
that they cannot reasonably accept by asking that either proper reasons be offered for
them or that they be changed’ (12). Against this background, she unfolds her discussion
of judicial review, which aims to demonstrate – by exposing its democratizing (i.e.
[re]politicizing) potential – that even a participatory conception of democracy can
defend such a non-majoritarian institution. Contrary to common interpretations, Lafont
highlights judicial review’s role as a ‘conversation initiator’ of a democratic debate: ‘the
main contribution of the institution is that it empowers citizens to call upon the rest of the
citizenry to publicly debate’ (238) fundamental political issues. It empowers them ‘to
call the rest of the citizenry to put on their robes’ (240). Judicial review here is seen as a
reactive ‘mechanism[] of correction’ (162), stimulating deliberation and promoting
vibrant democracy. It ‘guarantees that all citizens can [ . . . ] open or reopen a deliberative
process’ (212f.). This (re)opening works by providing reasoned objections. ‘In order to
trigger judicial review [citizens] must argue their case in court on the basis of reasons,
considerations, and arguments’ (210f.). This has to be kept in mind for my subsequent
discussion, as the reference to ‘providing appropriate reasons and evidence’ (193) raises
the question of what constitutes appropriate or good reason.
What, then, remains of this modelling when one confronts it with Young’s accusa-
tions from 2001, directed at most of the existing approaches to deliberative democracy at
that time? As Young herself points out, the first two accusations – concerned with the
lack of inclusion and insufficient publicity of certain institutions and procedures – do not
pose a great challenge to participatory deliberativists. They, too, would criticize and try
to combat these circumstances – even if by other means. The same obviously applies to
Lafont. The other two accusations are more serious in Young’s eyes. Since, in my
opinion, Lafont can also, at least basically, deal with the third accusation – which
concerns the ignoring of structural inequality in the form of power relations sedimented
in institutions – by rightly referring to the reflexive ‘supervision-function’ of judicial
review, I would like to come straight to the fourth and most profound accusation. The
activist worries that deliberation may be ‘influenced by a common discourse that itself is
a complex product of structural inequality’ (Young 2001, 685). Such a discourse conveys
‘the widely accepted generalizations about how society operates [ . . . ], as well as the
social norms and cultural values to which most of the people appeal when discussing
their social and political problems’ (Young 2001, 685). Inasmuch as such ‘social ima-
ginaries’ naturalize unjust power relations or falsely universalize a particular perspec-
tive, Young speaks of ideology. The phenomenon of ideology ‘refers to how the
conceptual and normative framework of the members of society is deeply influenced
by premises and terms of discourse that make it difficult to think critically about aspects
of their social relations or alternative possibilities of institutionalization and action’
(Young 2001, 685f.). Young’s objection to (almost all) representatives of deliberative
democracy is that they do not take this into account sufficiently (if at all) and thereby
negate or at least conceal ideological forces. The general problem is quite obvious and
relates to the previously mentioned question of the ‘appropriateness’ of reasons and
evidence: Advocates of deliberative democracy commit citizens to argumentative
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language-based action, requiring them to navigate in an always already existing space of
reasons, which determines what good and bad reasons are and what counts as a reason at
all. Accordingly, certain speech acts have to be suspended as inappropriate, irrational or
simply as ‘noise’. As noted by such different authors like Robert Talisse, Sally Haslanger
or Toby Rollo, this is problematic because the very vocabularies in which public dis-
cussion is – or: has to be – conducted may contribute to the continuation and reinforcing
perpetuation of injustice and there may be no vocabulary-immanent way to reflect on
that. Lafont’s approach is not immune to these objections either, which becomes par-
ticularly apparent in connection with the institution of judicial review. In one way or
another, there will be a kind of ‘gatekeeper moment’ in which the admissibility of a
petition is examined and a decision is made if a review is granted or denied. Ideological
distortions can lead to certain claims being classified as ‘noise’ and dismissed as such
during the process of case selection. In these cases, the judges do not feel or think or even
have to have a ‘legal obligation to examine the complaints of litigants, to listen to their
arguments, and to provide a reasoned answer’ (233). If one assumes that judicial review
is always linked to a prior ‘admissibility examination’ of a complaint, it should be
pointed out that such procedures virtually force one to play the existing ‘language game’.
Positions that do not fit into the existing language game – or cannot be fitted in – are then
effectively silenced. Not every case brought to the ‘gatekeeper’ of the court will succeed
in becoming the subject of a judicial review, thereby producing the democratic effects
Lafont is hoping for. If such an ideologically conditioned act of selection happens, it
happens even before the actual process of judicial review can function as a ‘conversation
initiator’. Although Lafont addresses certain issues related to the independence of the
judiciary, more subtle forms of dependence – like ideological dependence – do not come
into view. What Lafont’s approach seems to be missing from my point of view is an
enrichment by an ideology-sensitive social theory – in order to be also a critical theory of
democracy.
(II) This leads me to my second point. Since every normative account of democratic
legitimacy also involves prescriptions for how citizens ought to be politically engaged,
the non-thematization of ideology also has to have implications for what is considered as
legitimate political action. Only in such an ‘ideal-theoretical’, ideology-dismissing per-
spective, one can propagate reason-based argumentation as the only adequate (i.e. legit-
imate) form of political action. Dismissing ideology tempts one to define epistemic
quality exclusively in argumentative terms. As Maeve Cooke has highlighted elsewhere,
this ‘leaves no room for an understanding of epistemic quality that is non-argumentative’
(Cooke 2013, 264), which is then mirrored in the question of what is considered as
legitimate political action and what is not (or as political action at all). An account of
democracy that is defined exclusively in argumentative terms – Young speaks of ‘pri-
vileging argument’ – could then be said to leave no room for an understanding of
political agency that is non-argumentative. ‘Privileging argument’ leads to a world
where forms, means and meanings of political action otherwise than deliberativist polit-
ical action get normatively discredited and analytically invisibilized.
Lafont’s approach is a prime example of an approach that privileges argument. As
depicted under the label deliberative activism, the ‘good citizen’ of deliberative democ-
racy exchanges good reasons with her fellow citizens to reach generally binding
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decisions, or challenges binding rules on the basis of appropriate reasons. Therefore,
‘argument constitutes the primary [if not the only; PS] form of political communication’
(Young 2000, 37) and thus fosters ‘an identification of reasonable open public debate
with polite, orderly, dispassionate, gentlemanly argument’ (Young 2000, 49). Admit-
tedly, there is one single passage where Lafont points out that deliberative activism must
not be limited to ‘providing abstract arguments’ and ‘must [not] take the form of an
“idealized academic discourse”’ (30). But ultimately – by adding that non-discursive
actions are legitimate only as long as ‘the goal of such forms of political action is to
transform actual public opinion into considered public opinion’ (30) – such non-
discursive, disorderly and disruptive forms of political engagement are again committed
to argumentative communication and thereby forced under the prevailing order of jus-
tification. From the activist’s perspective, this has to be seen as problematic since for in
view of the presumed ideological closure that restricts the deliberative process in its
openness of outcome, he advocates ‘disruptive, annoying, or distracting’ (Young 2000,
49) communicative acts, which ‘confront rather than engage in discussion’ (Young 2001,
670). The activist doesn’t do that – at least not necessarily – out of pure pleasure in riot or
non-conformity. There is indeed a communicative intention, albeit with different means
and objectives, than a very narrow understanding of communication would suggest. His
rationale is the following: unlike argumentative communication, which must necessarily
remain within the framework of an already existing ‘language game’, such non-
discursive actions aim ‘to rupture a stream of thought rather than to weave an argument’
(Young 2001, 687). They are meant to mess up what, until then, his fellow citizens ‘may
have found normal and acceptable’ (Young 2001, 675). I would like to extent Young’s
thoughts by adding that rather than being solely disruptive, such non-discursive actions
may also involve a claim to practical world-disclosure. The point of this world-
disclosing, prefigurative political agency (cf. Raekstad and Gradin 2020) is, after all,
‘that it demonstrates to the people, rather than argues, that an alternative is possible
[and] reasonable’ (Rollo 2017, 595) – even if not under the existing standards of reason-
ableness. In the case of prefigurative politics, the meaning of non-discursive politics
consists not only in bringing certain topics and demands to the table, but also in attempt-
ing ‘to establish new norms of conduct and governance’ (Rollo 2017, 595), new voca-
bularies or ‘new ways of seeing in the domain of practical reason’ (Cooke 2013, 257). Its
emancipatory value and meaning lies precisely in the fact that the existing, possibly
ideologically hardened frame of reference is broken up – by enacting visible features of
an alternatively institutionalized world.1
But if the definition of (legitimate) political agency is narrowed down to only include
acts that promote and contribute to an ongoing reason-based deliberation – and thus
remain bound to a possibly ideologically sealed off order of justification –, then world-
disclosing, non-argumentative practices ‘may not qualify as political action or as ful-
filling democratic ideals’ (Rollo 2017, 594). Political action otherwise than deliberativist
political action gets normatively discredited. What are the consequences? First, the
potentially ideology-critical and emancipatory effects of non-argumentative action tend
to be overlooked analytically. Furthermore, stipulating rational and argumentative dia-
logue as the sole medium of (democratic) political agency is not only not critical of
ideology but might also have an ideology-promoting effect, because, as, for example,
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Haslanger (2017, 7) recently pointed out, ‘ideology is part of what gives people their
tools of reasoning in the first place’. Therefore, and to the extent that Lafont ultimately
commits herself completely to a ‘privileging argument’-approach, I see a danger that her
approach risks unintentionally contributing to the perpetuation of potentially ideological




1. In Haslanger (2017), a corresponding interpretation of such practices as decidedly ideology-
critical can be found.
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